When the information of many individuals is pooled, the resulting aggregate often is a good predictor of unknown quantities or facts ("wisdom of crowds"). This aggregate predictor frequently outperforms the forecasts of experts or even the best individual forecast included in the aggregation process. However, an appropriate aggregation mechanism is considered crucial to reaping the benefits of a "wise crowd". Of the many possible ways to aggregate individual forecasts, we compare (uncensored and censored) mean and median, continuous double auction market prices and sealed bid-offer call market prices in a controlled experiment. We use an asymmetric information structure where subjects know different subsets of the total information needed to exactly calculate the asset value to be estimated. We find that prices from continuous double auction markets clearly outperform all alternative approaches for aggregating dispersed information and that information is only useful to the best-informed subjects.
One more sophisticated averaging approach is advanced by Budescu and Chen (2014) , as 24 e.g., they use a model that identifies experts in the crowd and weights their opinions by 25 relevance when aggregating the individual estimates to a group opinion.
26
In a more nuanced finding, Malone et al. (2009) argue that averaging is a surprisingly 27 good tool when estimating a certain number, but that in more complex situations more 28 complex mechanisms are needed to aggregate information efficiently. They list "prediction 29 markets" and markets with monetary or non-monetary incentives as being such mechanisms.
30
In line with this view, market-based mechanisms have indeed gained significant attention 31 in recent decades. In prediction markets, the market's organizers create an asset whose 32 value is tied to the outcome to be estimated.
2 Defining such assets thus transforms the 33 estimation of an unknown outcome or its probability into a task that can be accomplished by 34 a market. In markets, prices have the role of aggregating available information. We explore 35 a setting with asymmetric information, as in many relevant predictions (e.g., future stock 36 prices, betting outcomes, etc.) participants will typically have different information and -
37
even more relevant -information of different quality. We mimic this with our experimental 38 design, where we can clearly distinguish better and worse informed subjects. Jensen's (1906) inequality to prove that the absolute forecast error of the average estimate must be smaller than or equal to the average of the individual estimates' absolute forecast errors. For the task of arriving at a point forecast, this implies that the average over a set of estimates is a (probabilistically) better -i.e., more precise -predictor of the value to be estimated than a randomly chosen element of the set of estimates.
2 Such a derivative asset may, for example, at a pre-defined maturity date, pay a fixed amount of money conditional on an underlying event having occurred (e.g., a contract that pays $ 1 if politician X gets elected). Alternatively, the asset may pay an amount that is a linear function of the underlying number to be estimated (e.g., a contract that pays $ x · 100, where x is the vote share of politician X, in percent). 
73
To summarize, all subjects have some, but incomplete information about the value of Of course, since subjects can view and handle jars, they can instantly establish a lower bound above 0 even in I0.
Procedure
The experiment consists of six sessions with 24 subjects each, conducted on February 22 87 and 23, 2017, in the Innsbruck EconLab. The 144 subjects were recruited from a standard 88 student subjects pool using hroot (Bock et al., 2014 ) and the experiment was conducted 89 using GIMS 7.4.16 (Palan, 2015), programmed in z-Tree 3.6.7 (Fischbacher, 2007) .
90
Half of the six sessions employ a call auction (CA), the other half a continuous double 91 auction (CDA) trading protocol. In each session, subjects arrive outside the lab and, after 92 an experimenter has checked their IDs, are randomly assigned to workstations in the lab. An 93 experimenter then reads out aloud the instructions on the respective trading mechanisms, 94 with subjects reading along using personal sets of paper copies of the instructions, which they 95 retain for the entire experiment.
5 Subjects then complete a trial period to get acquainted 96 with the trading interface. Following that, we hand out a second set of instructions that 97 contains information on the asset, on the tasks to perform in the experiment, and on the 98 payoff calculation.
99
The 24 subjects in each session are split into three groups of eight subjects each. These 100 groups remain fixed throughout the experiment (partner matching within ±5% of the true value they receive 20 cents, for each estimate that is within ±15% 111 they receive 10 cents, and for each estimate that is within ±25% they receive 5 cents.
112
After they have submitted their estimates, subjects are each endowed (virtually, on the 113 computer) with 5 jars and an amount of experimental euros averaging twice the value of the 5 114 jars, while ensuring that subjects cannot calculate the jar value from their cash endowment.
The ratio of outstanding cash to the value of outstanding assets, commonly referred to as 116 5 A translation of all instructions, which were originally in German, is included in the online appendix. 6 For the determination of these euro amounts, we started from two principles. First, there should be no direct correspondence between euro amount and jar value to prevent traders from inferring the latter from the former. Second, the cash-to-asset value ratio should be constant at a value of 2 across all markets. We thus obtained the euro values as follows: We randomly drew (and redrew), for each subject, cash endowments from a uniform distribution over [200, 300] experimental euros. We repeated the drawing until the absolute deviation of total cash endowment in the market from total asset endowment value equalled, to two decimal places, 2. We thus obtain individual cash endowments which vary substantially around twice the value of the asset endowment, while ensuring that the cash-to-asset value ratio always equals 2 at the market level. See Table A .8 in the appendix for details. Subjects are symmetrically informed that each subject is endowed with 5 jars and they are told that each subject is endowed with a euro amount that varies across subjects and periods. They are not informed about details of the cash endowment determination algorithm.
the cash-to-asset ratio, thus is 2. This ensures that traders are able to make transactions at 117 reasonable frequencies and prices but it is also reasonably low to avoid biasing our results
118
by cash endowment effects (see Kirchler et al., 2012 and Noussair and Tucker, 2016 and the 119 references therein for evidence on the effect of cash endowments on mispricing). Subjects 120 then trade assets for cash for three minutes both in the CA and in the CDA treatments.
121
Unexecuted orders can be canceled without cost at any time, and are executed according to Before continuing to the discussion of our experimental results, we wish to take a moment 141 to discuss some of our design choices. We accordingly structure this section by topic. tion target (e.g., which distribution it is drawn from) or on estimator characteristics (e.g., There, their information is rendered worthless when it becomes publicly known. This ar-172 gument also applies in our experiment. If forecasts derived from market experiments do a 173 good job of predicting the underlying and unknown value, this is because subjects have in-174 centives to perform well in the market, and despite them having incentives to withhold their 175 information (particularly when it is superior to others') from other market participants so 176 they alone can profit from it. In any case, we expect subjects in our market experiments to 177 reveal their information only gradually, such that price efficiency improves over time within 178 trading periods, and that later prices are more informative than earlier ones. 
198
For our subsequent analyses, we define a subject's jar value estimate deviation Dev as:
Here, θ ∈ {pre, post} signifies whether the estimate was made prior to (pre) or after (post) Table 2 regresses Dev and AbsDev on subjects' experience in judging jars and on their 204 information level (JarNo equals 1 for the first jar a subject sees, 2 for the second, etc.). 7 Due to the log specification, this measure is independent of the choice of numeraire (i.e., whether one expresses prices as taler/jar or jars/taler). See Powell (2016) for details.
8 Table A .9 in the appendix repeats this analysis but includes subject dummy variables (albeit, to conserve space, not in the output) to give a better indication of the explanatory power of the models (R 2 > 0.5 throughout) when accounting for subject heterogeneity. We first analyze the best way to aggregate subjects' value estimates. We start by using
219
(1) the average and (2) the median values of subjects' estimates. The three rows in Fig-220 ure 3 illustrate estimate deviations over jars, periods and information levels, respectively, 221 using both mean and median. Overall, we find that mean and median lead to very similar 222 aggregates for subjects' estimates and that neither is clearly superior to the other.
223
The first row in Figure 3 shows aggregated estimate deviation for each of the four jars 
228
The second row shows aggregated estimate deviation, pooled over all jars, for each of 229 the three periods that subjects trade the same jar. It provides (weak) evidence for some 230 learning, as absolute estimate deviations decline slightly with experience.
231
The third row in Figure 3 shows subjects' estimates depending on information level.
232
The right-hand panel documents that higher information levels correspond to lower estimate has never before received such high-level information and thus has not had the chance to 250 learn from her mistakes in the past to the same degree. We provide evidence supporting 251 this explanation in Appendix C. blocks, but not between the third and fourth (period 10).
279
A way to improve aggregate estimation quality may be to remove outliers before aggregat-280 ing individual estimates. We find, however, that trimming subjects' estimates by removing 
Learning

284
We next turn to learning effects within a block of three periods when the same jar was traded,
285
i.e., to whether subjects' estimates improve over these three periods. For each subject and 286 jar, we define ∆AbsDev t as the change in absolute log estimate deviation from one period 
We then regress ∆AbsDev t∈1,2 on subjects' absolute log estimate deviation after they The coefficients of these regressors can thus be interpreted as the fraction of the initial 293 absolute log estimate deviation that subjects correct due to learning from trading. We 
where AbsDev post t=1 is the subject's absolute log estimate deviation for a particular jar,
301
after receiving information and before trading in the first period of trading this jar, and 
Market-level results
314
We now turn to the comparison of the two market mechanisms Call Auction vs. Continuous 
317
If subjects learned across jars and over time, we would expect a monotonous upward trend.
318
There is no clear evidence for such learning, except for CA in the first two periods. showing estimate deviations, which follow a similar pattern, yet remain at a higher level.
327
This documents that market prices offer more precise predictions of jar value than individual 328 estimates. 
Subject earnings
330 Table 5 reports a regression analyzing the percentage change in subjects' wealth, ∆W ealth:
We multiply by 100 to scale up the regression coefficients for better legibility. Regarding 1728 1728 * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors adjusted for 144 clusters at the subject level in parentheses. Table 5 : Regressions of percentage change in subject's wealth (evaluated at BBV) over the course of a period.
The highly significant coefficients for AbsDev post in Table 5 show that subjects with where good estimates of an unknown quantity are required, it is impractical to let subjects 367 trade/estimate for multiple periods. The table shows that the absolute deviation is lowest 368 when using the midpoint of the bid-ask spread in the continuous double auction.
369 Table 7 displays p-values when comparing the average deviations resulting from the use 370 of the aggregation mechanisms listed in Table 6 . Table 7 uses only data from the first period 10 However, we caution against placing too much weight on this final column, since the results may to some degree be driven by collinearity. The Pearson correlation between Dev pre and Dev post is 0.527 (using only the first periods of trading a jar, to isolate the pure effect of the information levels, without influence from trading experience).
11 We discard 7 out of our 1746 (0.4%) offers outstanding at the end of a period because they have prices of 1000 or above, which are likely not meant to be serious and even if so, would bias our results without adding valuable insights. Furthermore, we are most interested in Period 1 data and these outliers only ocur in Period 3 data.
12 We end up with 4 out of 108 (3.7%) periods where we cannot calculate a bid-ask midpoint due to missing best bid or best ask values. Table 7 : p-values from pairwise t-tests comparing the log deviations from BBV resulting from different aggregation mechanisms using only data from the first period within a block.
Conclusion
380
The present paper reports on a lab experiment studying different mechanisms for aggregating case-by-case basis, weighing the CDA's greater costs against the benefits that can be derived 397 from the greater forecast precision it offers.
398
We hope that in addition to our results per se, our methodology may also help future 13 Note that, at the extremes, a two-tailed trim percentage of zero implies no removal of outliers, while a percentage of 50 implies using the median estimate only. tion levels I1, I2 or I3, (3) a dummy variable for whether the observations stem from a call auction market, and (4) a dummy variable for whether the subject in question was female.
437
Note that the regressions in Table C Table C .10: OLS regressions of |Dev pre t | on dummy variables for the jars, for having previously received information levels I1 through I3, for the trading mechanism and subject gender.
The first content column in Table C .10 documents that subjects learn across jars. The 440 more jars they have previously traded, the lower their absolute log estimate deviation. 9 9 9 9 9 * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Table D .12: OLS regressions of period averages of absolute log market price deviations on absolute log deviations of estimates before information revelation and jar dummies, using only the first periods of trading per session.
